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Abstract. The high fraction of published results that turn out to be incorrect
is a major concern of today’s science. This paper contributes to the under-
standing of this problem in two independent directions. First, Johnson’s recent
claim [1] that hypothesis testing with a significance level of α = 0.05 can alone
lead to an unacceptably large proportion of false positives among all results is
shown to be unfounded. Second, a way to quantify the effect of “positivity bias”
(the tendency to consider only positive results as worthwhile) is introduced.
We estimate the proportion of false positives among positive results in terms of
the significance level used and the positivity ratio. The latter quantity is the
fraction of positive results over all results, be they positive or not, published or
not. In particular, if one uses a significance level of α = 0.05, and produces
4 (possibly unpublished) negative results for every positive result, then the
proportion of false positives among positive results can climb to a high 21%.
What are the main reasons behind the very significant proportion (see [2–4]) of
scientific findings that fail to replicate? The goal of the present paper is to discuss
two independent aspects of this question. In the first part, we show that Johnson’s
recent proposal that the use of a significance level of α = 0.05 can alone lead to a
high proportion of false positives among all results is unfounded. In short, when
discussing a fraction of false positives, the numerator of this fraction (the number of
false positives) is always unambiguous, but the denominator is often kept implicit,
and may vary from place to place, leading to unwarranted conclusions. In the second
part, we discuss a way to evaluate the ratio of false positives among positive results
only, in terms of the significance level and the positivity ratio, which is defined as
the proportion of positive results among all results. We will see that when one uses
the significance level α = 0.05, even moderately low values of the positivity ratio
can lead to a high fraction of false positives among positive results.
1. Johnson’s claim and refutation
Assume that we want to evaluate the adequacy of a particular null hypothesis H0
against data. A standard procedure for doing so consists in specifying a significance
level α 1, and constructing a set of possible outcomes that are so extreme that if
H0 is true, then the probability to observe a value in this set of extreme outcomes is
no more than α. Once this set of extreme outcomes (the rejection region) is defined,
one performs the experiment and checks whether the result falls within this set. If
so, the test is said to be positive (or significant), and the null hypothesis is rejected.
The test is a false positive if it is positive although H0 is actually true.
A common reformulation of this procedure goes through the computation of the
so-called p-value. In this framework, the event that the test is positive corresponds
to the fact that the p-value is smaller than α.
In the long run, the proportion of false positives produced by a scientist will
depend on the significance level she chooses, but also on the fraction of cases
investigated where the associated null hypothesis is correct. If a scientist chooses
a significance level of α = 0.05, even in the worst-case scenario where the null
hypothesis is correct in every case, she is guaranteed that the proportion of false
positives among all results be no more than 5% in the long run.
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Figure 1. On this sample of 102 results, only 3 are false positives,
but 20% of the marginally significant ones are false positives.
In Ref. [1], Johnson seems to reach a different conclusion. His main message is
that the use of a significance level of α = 0.05 can alone explain the high proportion
of results that fail to reproduce (and that standard statistical practice must therefore
be revised). This can be summarized as follows.
Johnson’s Claim 1. Fixing the significance level at α = 0.05 can cause the
proportion of false positives among all results to be unacceptably large.
One gathers from Ref. [1] that “unacceptably large” should be understood as
“about 20% or more”. Johnson explains that this effect does not take publication
bias into account, so “among all results” includes positive as well as negative ones.
Yet, this contradicts our initial observation on hypothesis testing. The contradic-
tion dissipates once we notice that Johnson’s argument actually shows:
Johnson’s Claim 2. Fixing the significance level at α = 0.05 can cause the
proportion of false positives among marginally significant results to be as high
as 20%.
The crucial difference between this and Johnson’s Claim 1 is the phrase “among
marginally significant results”. A result is marginally significant if the observed
data is extreme enough to fall within the rejection region, but just barely so. This
corresponds to obtaining a p-value below but very close to α.
In order to best see that Johnson’s Claim 2 does not imply his Claim 1, it
suffices to imagine a scenario where the null hypothesis of every test is correct. In
such a case, 100% of significant results are false positives, and in particular, every
marginally significant result is a false positive. Yet, in the long run, the proportion
of false positives among the totality of results (be they positive or negative) is 5%.
In any case, Johnson’s Claim 2 will not bring about many false positives as
long as the proportion of marginally significant results remains small. A typical
situation is illustrated in Figure 1, where 20% of marginally significant results are
false positives, but only 3 results over 102 are false positives.
In the precise setting explored in Ref. [1], although Johnson’s Claim 2 is true, it
turns out that the probability to get a positive result is 0.275, while the probability
for a positive result to be a false positive is about 0.09. This probability of 0.09
is markedly smaller than 20% since it is averaged over all significant results, not
only over marginally significant ones. Overall, the probability of a false positive is
thus 0.275× 0.09 = 0.025. This means that in the long run, the proportion of false
positives among all results is no more than 2.5% 6 5%, as expected. All this will
be explained in much greater details in Supplementary Information [S1], but the
reader can also directly have a look at Property 3 there, which turns Figure 1 into
a more quantitative statement.
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Johnson’s arguments
Claim 1
Claim 2
Statistical practice
must be revised
?
Figure 2. Claim 1 is not substantiated by Johnson’s arguments;
Claim 2 does not call for a revision of standard statistical practice.
To sum up, Johnson’s Claim 1 is unfounded, while his Claim 2 does not call for a
revision of standard statistical practice (see Figure 2). Fixing the significance level
at α = 0.05 does guarantee a proportion of false positives among all results of no
more than 5%, and possibly less, depending on the fraction of cases studied where
the null hypothesis is actually true.
A well-known shortcoming of hypothesis testing is that as is, a significant result
gives no information about the actual size of the deviation from the null hypothesis.
One possible way to move beyond this limitation is to use Bayesian reasoning, but
a difficulty lies in the definition of an appropriate a priori Bayesian assumption.
Another goal of Ref. [1] is to advertise the use of a priori Bayesian assumptions defined
via “objective” optimization methods. Defining an a priori Bayesian assumption in
such a way leads however to incoherent results, as will be discussed in Supplementary
Information [S1], and is thus best avoided. In situations with no reasonably good
Bayesian a priori assumption in sight, the evaluation of a confidence interval for the
quantity of interest seems to be a much better practice.
2. Controlling the effects of positivity bias
As was reiterated above, fixing the significance level at α = 0.05 guarantees that
no more than 5% (and probably less) of obtained results are false positives. Yet,
this may not be a good measure of the proportion of false positives among published
papers, due to publication bias [5, 6].
In fact, publication bias is only one manifestation of a more general tendency
to give more importance to positive results than to negative ones. Indeed, even in
the absence of publication bias, if the readership only focuses on positive results,
the net effect is identical. Let us call this tendency to give more value to positive
results than to negative ones the positivity bias.
This bias is not necessarily a bad thing in itself. For instance, a pharmaceutical
company searching for new drugs to develop will understandably focus more on
results that show a therapeutic effect than not. Naturally, it will also pay some
attention to negative results (e.g. by looking for studies that contradict positive
studies of interest), but when assessing the proportion of studies that fail to replicate,
this will be taken over a set of positive studies only.
In short, when the high rate of non-reproducible results is discussed, it is best
understood as a proportion over positive results only. As was seen, the guarantee
provided by standard statistical tests is different, being about the proportion of
false positives over all results, be they positive or negative. The aim of this section
is to discuss how the guarantee is affected by this change of viewpoint.
Without further assumptions, there is of course no way to guarantee any control
on the rate of false positives among positive results. Indeed, it may be that a
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α = 0.1 α = 0.05 α = 0.01 α = 0.005
r = 1/2 11% 5.3% 1.0% 0.5%
r = 1/5 44% 21% 4.0% 2.0%
r = 1/10 100% 47% 9.1% 4.5%
Table 1. Maximal proportion of false positives among positive
results, as a function of the significance level α and the positivity
ratio r, according to Formula (1).
scientist studies only cases where her null hypothesis is actually correct, and in such
a situation, all positive results are false positives.
One possible way to get a more meaningful result is to assume that in, say, half
of the cases, the scientist’s intuition is correct, i.e. the null hypothesis is wrong.
This assumption has two drawbacks. First, it is not sufficient per se to rule out a
situation of 100% of false positives among positive results (indeed, it could happen
that all cases where the null hypothesis is wrong are missed by the scientist), so it
would need to be complemented by other assumptions. Second, it is very difficult in
practice to evaluate the validity of an assumption involving the proportion of cases
where the null hypothesis is actually correct.
It is much more fruitful to reason in terms of the fraction of positive results over
all results produced, be they positive or negative, published or kept private. Let us
call this ratio the positivity ratio r. For one, each scientist can easily have a rough
idea of her own positivity ratio. Secondly, one can devise a useful prediction on the
fraction of false positives among positive results, in terms of the positivity ratio r
and the significance level α used. Indeed, the proportion of false positives among
positive results can be shown (see Supplementary Information [S2]) to be no larger
than
(1) α(1− r)
r(1− α) .
Table 1 gives this maximal proportion of false positives among positive results for
a selection of values of α and r. For instance, for a positivity ratio of 1/2 and for
α = 0.05, this guarantees that no more than about 5.3% of positive results are false
positives. Remarkably, for a positivity ratio of 1/5 (which corresponds to producing
4 negative results for every positive result), statistical tests with significance level
α = 0.05 can yield a proportion of false positives among positive results as large as
21%. In such a case, the use of a significance level of α = 0.01 restores a proportion
of false positives among positive results smaller than 5%. Similarly, for r = 1/10,
a significance level of α = 0.005 guarantees a proportion of false positives among
positive results smaller than 5%.
A slightly different way to think about Formula (1) is displayed in Figure 3.
Compute positivity ratio
r = # positive results# results
Is r > 0.34?
No more than 10%
of false positives
among positive results
yes
1
Figure 3. A simple flowchart for a significance level α = 0.05,
derived from Formula (1).
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3. Conclusions
First, we re-affirmed the fundamental properties of hypothesis testing, and showed
that Johnson’s claim [1] that choosing a significance level of α = 0.05 can alone lead
to a very high proportion of false positives among all results is unfounded.
Second, we explored the interactions between the choice of the significance level
and positivity bias. We introduced the positivity ratio r, which is the fraction of
positive results over the totality of results, be they positive or not, published or not.
One can bound the proportion of false positives among positive results in terms of
the positivity ratio and the significance level α used, according to Formula (1). This
proportion can be as high as 21% if one assumes r = 1/5 and α = 0.05.
It is natural to wonder how these observations can be turned into recommendations.
These should depend on what the positivity ratio of the scientific community as a
whole (or within subfields) is. If it is about 1/3 or more, then the common practice
of using a significance level of α = 0.05 guarantees a small (6 10%) proportion of
false positives among positive results. If instead, the positivity ratio is observed to
be about 1/5 or less, then one should seriously consider moving to a significance
level of α = 0.01, so as to bring the high 21% or more of predicted false positives
among positive results back to a more reasonable fraction. Using a significance
level of α = 0.01 would guarantee a proportion of false positives among positive
results of no more than 5% as soon as r > 0.17, and of no more than 10% as soon
as r > 0.092. In most cases, scientific endeavors for which data collection is costly
or time-consuming can probably not afford smaller positivity ratios. On the other
hand, the statistical treatment of data-intensive subjects must be handled with more
precaution.
A final note of caution is in order. So far, we have only considered problems
that could arise from insufficiently strong statistical tests and positivity bias. An
analysis of retracted biomedical and life-science research articles [7] has however
revealed that a large majority of retractions were in fact attributable to scientific
misconduct. This problem, of course, was not taken into account in this paper.
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ON JOHNSON’S ARGUMENTS
The aim of this supplementary information is to substantiate the claims made in
the main text that relate to Johnson’s arguments [1]. It is essentially self-contained,
so that I hope that any interested scientist can read it.
In Section 1, we review the main features of hypothesis testing. Johnson’s
argument is based on Bayesian reasoning. The aim of Section 2 is to introduce
such a setting and show an apparently paradoxical situation that is similar, but
simpler, than that encountered by Johnson. In Section 3, we present Johnson’s
setting and assumptions proper, and explain why they do not imply the announced
high rate of false positives among all results. The goal of Section 4 is to show that
Johnson’s proposed method for defining an a priori Bayesian hypothesis leads to
incoherent results, and should thus be avoided. Section 5 backs the contentious
claims attributed to Johnson with quotations from Ref. [1].
1. Hypothesis testing
We begin by describing an example of hypothesis testing that is best suited for
a comparison with Johnson’s setting. Let us imagine that Alice plans to run an
experiment that consists in repeating n times independently the same protocol,
whose aim is to measure a (dimensionless) quantity of interest. In the end of the
experiment, she will have gathered n measurements (x1, . . . , xn) = x. Her null
hypothesis is that the distribution of these measurements is Gaussian with mean 0
and variance 1. Her scientific motivation for the experiment is that she suspects
that the mean may in fact be positive. Her plan is to compute the empirical mean
x = (x1 + · · ·+ xn)/n, and hopefully observe that it is significantly above 0.
In order to give this idea a precise sense, she decides to devise a hypothesis test
with significance level α = 0.05. Under the null hypothesis, the empirical mean x is
centered Gaussian with mean 0 and variance 1/n, so the probability that x exceeds
1.65/
√
n is about 0.05.1 In view of this, she decides that she will have disproved
the null hypothesis if at the end of her experiment, she finds x > 1.65/√n. She has
ensured the following property.
Property 1. If the null hypothesis H0 is true, then the probability that the test
indicates to reject the null hypothesis (a case of false positive) is no more than
α = 0.05.
The statistical test designed by Alice is just one particular example of hypothesis
testing with significance level α = 0.05. In any case, we want Property 1 to be
satisfied. By the law of large numbers, Property 1 implies the following.
Consequence 1. Assume that Alice performs K  1 experiments, each with a
significance level of α = 0.05. Assume also that the null hypothesis is true in half of
her experiments. Then the proportion of false positives among all results is no more
than 2.5% (i.e. 5% of the cases where the null hypothesis is true).
Under the same assumptions but with a different reasoning, Johnson [1] reaches
the conclusion that the proportion of false positives should rather be of 20%, or
possibly more. This is in contradiction with Consequence 1, and our purpose is to
see why Johnson’s claim is unfounded.
1 The mathematically minded reader may prefer to replace the approximate value 1.65 by x∗
such that 1√2pi
∫ +∞
x∗ e
−x2/2 dx = 0.05.
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One could rephrase Alice’s hypothesis test in terms of the computation of the
p-value. I will not recall what the p-value is here, but simply mention that the test
as described above corresponds to checking whether the p-value is below α = 0.05.
2. Bayesian reasoning and an apparent paradox
The goal of this section is to explain in a simple setting some apparently para-
doxical facts that I believe to be similar to those encountered by Johnson.
We want to reconsider Alice’s problem using a Bayesian approach. The starting
point of Bayesian reasoning is to define a priori probabilities on the set of possible
distributions of Alice’s quantity of interest. Let us suppose that Alice chooses to
encode her a priori belief in the results of her experiment as follows. Her a priori
assumption is that for some specific µ > 0 of her choosing,
(BH) with probability 1/2, the hypothesis H0 is true,with probability 1/2, the hypothesis Hµ is true,
where H0 (resp. Hµ) is the hypothesis that the measurements are distributed as
independent Gaussian random variables of mean 0 (resp. µ) and variance 1.
This assumption could be justified for instance if Alice collects her data from
Bob, and knows that he generates them in the following way. Bob (secretly) tosses
a fair coin. If he gets “head”, then he supplies Alice with independent Gaussian
variables of mean 0 and variance 1; otherwise, he supplies her with independent
Gaussian variables of mean µ and variance 1. Of course, this example is only meant
to guide our intuition, but more realistic scenarios can be constructed. For instance,
Alice studies a population, and has noticed that she can subdivide it into two
subgroups G1 and G2 of equal size (based on, say, whether the individual carries
a specific gene or not). She also noticed that if she repeats some measurement on
an individual in G1 (resp. G2), she gets independent Gaussian variables of mean 0
(resp. µ) and variance 1. She is then interested in an individual drawn from the
entire population, and wonders whether it belongs to G1 or G2. Both settings fit
perfectly with assumption (BH). In the latter case, the event that the individual
belong to G1 (resp. G2) corresponds to hypothesis H0 (resp. Hµ).
It certainly comes to the reader’s mind that in many cases of interest, there will
be no way for Alice to come up with a specific value of µ such that assuming (BH)
becomes reasonable2. We will return to this critical question below, and focus for
now on exploring the mathematical implications of this assumption.
Under H0 (resp. Hµ), the empirical mean x follows a Gaussian distribution with
mean 0 (resp. µ) and variance 1/n. Hence, under the Bayesian hypothesis (BH),
the empirical mean is distributed according to the probability density
1
2
√
n√
2pi
(
e−nx
2/2 + e−n(x−µ)
2/2
)
dx.
The Bayesian method consists in computing (using Bayes formula) the a posteriori
probabilities of H0 and Hµ given the data x that was observed:
P [H0 | x] = p(x | H0)P [H0]
p(x) ,
where p(x) is the probability density of the variable x (assuming (BH)), and p(x |H0)
is the probability density of x conditionally on H0. A computation shows that this
is equal to
p(x | H0)P [H0]
p(x) =
e−nx
2/2
e−nx2/2 + e−n(x−µ)2/2
,
2The choice of the probabilities fixed at 1/2 – 1/2 in (BH) is another problem that we will
leave aside for simplicity.
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which can be rewritten as
(1) P [H0 | x] = 11 + BF(x) ,
where BF(x) is the Bayes factor
(2) BF(x) = en(2µx−µ2)/2.
Similarly, we get3
(3) P [Hµ | x] = 11 + 1/BF(x) .
Hence, a large Bayes factor indicates that Hµ is more likely to be true, while a small
one gives support for H0.
In view of assumption (BH), if n is very large, we have
(4) x '
∣∣∣∣ 0 with probability ' 1/2,µ with probability ' 1/2,
and as a consequence, the distribution of the Bayes factor is such that4
(5) BF(x) '
∣∣∣∣∣ e−nµ
2/2 with probability ' 1/2,
enµ
2/2 with probability ' 1/2.
In particular, when n is very large, it is extremely unlikely that the Bayes factor
takes moderate values, as for instance being in the interval [1/20, 20]. Hence, a test
that would consist in declaring that the hypothesis Hµ is empirically proved when
BF(x) > 1 would actually yield a false positive with very small probability if n is
very large, assuming that our a priori assumption (BH) is correct. This can look
paradoxical, since the information BF(x) > 1 seems basically useless at first sight.
Indeed, by (1), it only indicates that the a posteriori probability for H0 is smaller
than 1/2. Yet, for large n, the assumption (BH) forces the Bayes factor to have the
distribution described in (5), and thus outside of an event of very small probability,
asking to have BF(x) > 1 in fact forces the Bayes factor to be about enµ2/2, and
thus P [H0 | x] ' e−nµ2/2. Let us stress this:
Property 2. If Alice is right in her a priori assumption (BH), and if n is very
large, then the following holds. Conditionally on the event BF(x) > 1, although we
can only know for sure that P [H0 | x] 6 1/2, outside of a very unlikely event, we
actually have BF(x) ' enµ2/2 and P [H0 | x] ' e−nµ2/2. In particular,
P [H0 | BF(x) > 1] 1.
Consequence 2. If Alice is right in her a priori assumption (BH), and if n is very
large, then deciding to reject the null hypothesis H0 when BF(x) > 1 yields a very
small probability of false positive (i.e. a case where Alice rejects H0 although it was
correct).
3and recover the classical definition of the Bayes factor,
BF(x) = P [Hµ | x]
P [H0 | x]
P [H0]
P [Hµ]
= P [x | Hµ]
P [x | H0]
.
4My use of the sign ' is ambiguous, but the interested reader will easily make the statements (4)
and (5) more precise. For instance, we can pick some ε > 0 very small (in particular, smaller than
µ/2), and replace the statement “x ' 0 with probability ' 1/2” by “P [−ε 6 x 6 ε] −−−−→
n→∞
1/2”,
while replacing the statement “BF(x) ' e−nµ2/2 with probability ' 1/2” by
P
[
−µ
2
2
− εµ 6 log(BF(x))
n
6 −µ
2
2
+ εµ
]
−−−−→
n→∞
1/2.
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This can be made precise. For instance, one can check that as soon as
√
n >
2 × 1.65/µ, the test BF(x) > 1 to reject H0 has a probability of yielding a false
positive smaller than 0.025.
This being said, and although the policy described in Consequence 2 leads to a
very small probability of false positive when n is large, it would be strange for Alice
to choose the criterion BF(x) > 1 as her condition for when to reject H0. Indeed,
on the event that BF(x) > 1 but BF(x) ' 1, the evidence in favor of the alternative
hypothesis Hµ is only very weak. In fact, Consequence 2 would remain true if the
condition BF(x) > 1 was replaced by, for instance, the condition BF(x) > 1/20. Yet,
in the case when 1/20 6 BF(x) 6 1, the evidence actually favors hypothesis H0, so
it would be foolish to reject it in such a case. There is no contradiction however,
since the event that 1/20 6 BF(x) 6 1 has negligible probability when n is very
large, so that in practice, Alice will almost never encounter such a situation.
It is important to notice that all our reasoning relies on our assuming (BH) to
be a valid a priori assumption.
3. Johnson’s setting
In the case when Alice has no good prior information such as (BH) at hand,
Johnson argues that she could start with the a priori assumption (BH) with µ
given by a sort of automatic procedure that makes it the “best” possible µ in the
following sense. Alice gives herself a parameter γ and decides that she will support
the hypothesis Hµ as soon as she finds that the Bayes factor BF(x) exceeds γ. Then
µ is chosen so as to maximize Alice’s chances to find support for the alternative
hypothesis Hµ, that is, to find BF(x) > γ. Johnson finds that this optimal µ is5
(6) µ = µ(γ, n) =
√
2 log(γ)
n
.
With this choice of µ, a computation leads him to the observation that for γ = 3.87,
the condition6
{BF(x) > γ}
is precisely the same as the condition
{x > 1.65/√n},
that is, the condition obtained in Section 1 for rejecting the null hypothesis with
significance level α = 0.05. He then concludes that this gives only poor support for
assumption Hµ, since the condition BF(x) > γ with γ = 3.87 only means that the a
posteriori probability of Hµ is about 0.8, see (1).
The apparent contradiction is similar to that found in Property 2 and Conse-
quence 2. Indeed, similarly to what we saw there, under assumption (BH) and on
the event that BF(x) > 3.87, the Bayes factor is likely to be significantly larger
than the value 3.87. The effect is not as drastic as in Property 2 however. Indeed,
on the event BF(x) > 3.87 (and assuming (BH) to be correct), the Bayes factor
will have some small but non-negligible probability of taking a value that is only
moderately large, some other probability to be larger, yet some other probability of
being very large, and so on. Each of these sub-cases gives rise to a certain conditional
probability of a false positive. However, the total probability of a false positive is
an average over all these sub-cases, and by design, it remains smaller than 0.025. In
formulas,
P [false positive] = P [BF(x) > γ and H0] =
1
2 P [BF(x) > γ | H0],
5log denotes the natural logarithm
6The mathematically minded reader may prefer to replace 3.87 by γ∗ = e(x∗)2/2, where
x∗ ' 1.65 was defined in footnote (1).
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BF(x) 3.87 5.44 7.92 12.31 21.77 ∞
p-value 0.05 0.032 0.019 0.0094 0.0035 0
P [E] 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.075
P [H0|E] 0.18 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.03
Table 1. The first line of the table describes possible values of the
Bayes factor (and the corresponding p-value on the second line).
On the last two lines, a column in between two possible values of
the Bayes factor refers to the event E that the Bayes factor falls in
between these two values, see Property 3.
and for γ = 3.87, since {BF(x) > γ} = {x > 1.65/√n},
P [BF(x) > γ | H0] = P [x > 1.65/
√
n | H0] = 0.05,
so that indeed P [false positive] = 0.025. We illustrate this idea further in Table 1
by computing, for a selection of intervals, the probability that the Bayes factor falls
within this interval, and the probability of a false positive given that the Bayes
factor falls within this interval. The latter probability can be computed using (1):
P [H0 | BF(x) ∈ I] = E [P [H0 | x] | BF(x) ∈ I]
= E
[
1
1 + BF(x)
∣∣ BF(x) ∈ I] ,(7)
and in particular, the observation that the total probability of a false positive is
0.025 can be rewritten using (7) as
P [false positive] = P [H0 and BF(x) > 3.87]
= E
[
1
1 + BF(x)
∣∣ BF(x) > 3.87] P [BF(x) > 3.87] = 0.025.
From the values given in Table 1, we can verify that
P [H0 and BF(x) > 3.87] = 0.18× 0.05 + · · ·+ 0.03× 0.075 = 0.025.
A convenient way to interpret Table 1 and this relation is as follows.
Property 3. Assume that Alice performs K  1 experiments, each of them satisfy-
ing the a priori Bayesian assumption (BH) with µ given by (6). Then about 0.05K
of her results will have a Bayes factor between 3.87 and 5.44 (and a p-value between
0.05 and 0.032), and among these, about 0.18× 0.05K will have wrongly rejected
the null hypothesis H0. About 0.05K of her results results will have a Bayes factor
between 5.44 and 7.92 (and a p-value between 0.032 and 0.019), out of which about
0.13× 0.05K will have wrongly rejected H0, and so on, following the numbers given
in Table 1. In total, she has no more than about 0.025K papers wrongly rejecting
the null hypothesis H0, as expected.
4. Devising a priori hypotheses
In the previous section, we assumed that hypothesis (BH) with µ given by (6)
was correct. Under this assumption, we explained the workings of the Bayesian
approach, and showed why contrary to what was claimed in Ref. [1], it does not
lead to a high probability of false positive.
The key point to be stressed now is that all the reasoning in the previous section
can possibly make sense only if the a priori assumption (BH) with µ given by (6) is
believed to be correct. Otherwise, even the definition of the Bayes factor is groundless.
Yet, the single fact that µ was determined by the “objective” formula (6) is of course
no reason for putting faith in assumption (BH) with this specific µ. Actually, the fact
that the a priori assumption (BH) is defined without any concern for the specifics of
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the experiment under consideration is rather a very worrying sign for the validity of
(BH). Indeed, it may well be that the true distribution of Alice’s measurements is
very far from being close to any of the two distributions that appear in the a priori
assumption (BH). Johnson rightly points out that an advantage of the Bayesian
approach is that it can not only rule out the null hypothesis, but can also give
support for the alternative hypothesis. However, as long as Alice cannot convince
her readership that assuming (BH) with µ as in (6) is a valid assumption, this is
not helpful at all. In order to best illustrate this, imagine the following scenarios.
(1) Alice chooses the threshold value γ = 3.87, and does n = 100 measurements.
The empirical mean she obtains is x = 100. If she follows Johnson’s proposal, she
assumes (BH) with µ =
√
2 log(γ)/n = 0.165. She thus finds extremely strong
support for the hypothesis that her measurements have mean 0.165, with the
stratospheric Bayes factor of 10714, although recall that the empirical mean she
found is 100!
(2) Alice fixes her threshold value γ = 3.87 and takes µ as in (6). Her data then
shows strong support for the hypothesis Hµ. Meanwhile, her colleague Bob chooses
a different threshold, e.g. γ = 20, and also finds strong support for his alternative
hypothesis. This is very likely to happen for certain choices of the underlying distri-
bution, and yet note that Alice’s and Bob’s evidence-based alternative hypotheses
are different, since they correspond to different values of µ!
(3) Bob chooses the same γ as Alice, and both independently find support for
the alternative hypothesis. They then find out that they have done the same
experiment. They decide to group their data, and discover that since they now have
2n measurements instead of n each, their grouped data actually supports a different
hypothesis than that of each separately!
These examples vividly illustrate that the choice of the a priori Bayesian hypoth-
esis is not innocent. It needs to be carefully substantiated, instead of drawn from
some blind (albeit “objective”) automatic procedure.
As a side remark, let us note that if Alice is interested in estimating the mean of
her measurements and does not have much a priori knowledge on her experiment,
she can use the frequentist approach with good effect. Indeed, let us suppose that
she is willing to accept the assumption that her measurements follow a Gaussian
distribution with some unspecified mean µ and unspecified variance that is at most 1,
and is right in doing so. This is a much weaker assumption than (BH), since in
particular it does not specify a distribution on the possible values of µ themselves.
Under this sole assumption, she obtains that outside of an event whose probability
is smaller than 0.05, the true mean µ satisfies
|µ− x| 6 1.96√
n
.
5. Quotations from Ref. [1]
The aim of this section is to back the contentious claims attributed to Johnson
by quotations from Ref. [1].
His attributed main message is that the standard practice of fixing the significance
level at α = 0.05 can alone explain the high proportion of scientific results that fail
to reproduce. This was rephrased in the main text as
Claim 1. Fixing the significance level at α = 0.05 can cause the proportion of false
positives among all results to be unacceptably large.
In the introduction of Ref. [1], we read
“recent concerns over the lack of reproducibility of scientific studies
can be attributed largely to the conduct of significance tests at
unjustifiably high levels of significance.”
A highlighted piece of text reads
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“a root cause of nonreproducibility is traced to the conduct of
significance tests at inappropriately high levels of significance.”
(We learn elsewhere that α = 0.05 is an inappropriately high level of significance.)
We have seen (and this is very clearly illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 of the main text)
that Johnson’s Claim 2 (cf. main text) is not sufficient on its own to lead to such
conclusions. So I can see no way to interpret the above quotations other than as
meaning that Claim 1 holds. The fact that the proportion of false positives should
be taken among all results, be they positive or not, is substantiated by Johnson
explicitly stating that his argument does not involve publication bias:
“it is important to note that this high rate of nonreproducibility is
not the result of scientific misconduct, publication bias, file drawer
biases, or flawed statistical designs; it is simply the consequence of
using evidence thresholds that do not represent sufficiently strong
evidence in favor of hypothesized effects.”
The confusion between Claims 1 and 2 can be seen for instance in the following
passage.
“these results suggest that between 17% and 25% of marginally
significant scientific findings are false. This range of false positives
is consistent with nonreproducibility rates reported by others (e.g.,
ref. 5). If the proportion of true null hypotheses is greater than one-
half, then the proportion of false positives reported in the scientific
literature, and thus the proportion of scientific studies that would
fail to replicate, is even higher.”
While the first sentence refers to Claim 2, the rest refers to Claim 1.
It is also worth noting that under Johnson’s assumptions, the proportion of false
positives among positive results is about 9% (in particular, much smaller than 20%).
As a consequence, a modified Claim 1 that would involve the proportion of false
positives among positive results only would not be supported by Johnson’s example.
Besides, outside of Johnson’s assumptions, it is very easy to think of situations
where all positive results are false positives (e.g. when all tested null hypotheses are
true), no matter how small the significance level is.
A number of research papers have now appeared (see e.g. [2–9]) that refer to
Johnson’s article as proof that setting a significance level of 0.05 is bound to produce
unreliable results. A recent editorial [10] of the journal Toxicological Sciences
captures the essence of Johnson’s message very clearly:
“Dr Valen Johnson wrote a provocative article in the Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences arguing that our current standard
of p < 0.05 for significance is a major cause of scientific irrepro-
ducibility (Johnson, 2013). He proposes that science should move
toward significance levels of 0.005–0.001, and he is not talking about
big data science. He is talking about the routine sorts of assays
scientists, including toxicologists, have used for decades. While such
levels of significance take additional resources by requiring more
replicates, more samples, and more animals, he makes an excellent
case that there would be an overall cost savings to the scientific
enterprise. Inherent to his premise is that the cost of achieving
higher levels of significance would be offset by the resources wasted
chasing down spurious findings.”
The second contentious claim attributed to Johnson here is his recommendation
of using his method of devising a priori Bayesian assumptions (in our example, to
assume (BH) with µ given by (6)) for practical purposes. We read:
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“defining a Bayes factor requires the specification of both a null hy-
pothesis and an alternative hypothesis, and in many circumstances
there is no objective mechanism for defining an alternative hypoth-
esis. The definition of the alternative hypothesis therefore involves
an element of subjectivity, and it is for this reason that scientists
generally eschew the Bayesian approach toward hypothesis testing.
Efforts to remove this hurdle continue, however [ . . . ]. Recently,
Johnson (21) proposed a new method for specifying alternative
hypotheses.”
“These observations [ . . . ] suggest a simple strategy for improving
the replicability of scientific research. This strategy includes the
following steps: [ . . . ] When UMPBTs can be defined (or when other
default Bayesian procedures are available), report the Bayes factor
in favor of the alternative hypothesis and the default alternative
hypothesis that was tested.”
(The “default alternative hypothesis” coming from a “UMPBT” is that obtained
from Johnson’s procedure.)
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PROOF OF FORMULA (1)
The goal is to understand the fraction of false positives produced by a scientist
among all her positive results only, under the condition that she only uses statistical
tests with a fixed significance level α. Assume that she performs K  1 different
experiments, out of which K+ are positive (i.e. reached the conclusion to reject the
null hypothesis). Her positivity ratio r is the fraction of positive results over the
total, that is, r = K+/K.
Let η be the fraction of cases for which the null hypothesis was correct. Among
the cases where the null hypothesis was wrong, let β be the fraction of results that
were negative (β is close to 0 if the scientist is efficient in detecting when the null
hypothesis is wrong). The decomposition of all possible cases, together with their
relative proportions, is summarized in Table 1. The fact that out of ηK cases where
the null hypothesis is true, only ηαK yield a false positive, comes from the defining
property of the significance level (see Property 1 of Supplementary Information S1).
positive test negative test
H0 true
false positive
proportion ηα
true negative
proportion η(1− α)
H0 false
true positive
proportion (1− η)(1− β)
false negative
proportion (1− η)β
Table 1. A decomposition of possible cases, with their relative proportions.
An examination of Table 1 shows that
r = ηα+ (1− η)(1− β) 6 ηα+ 1− η,
which yields
η 6 1− r1− α.
Hence, the proportion of false positives over the totality of positive results is at most
ηα
r
6 α(1− r)
r(1− α) ,
as announced.
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